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When David Hume, disappointed with the lack of reactions to his Treatise 
of Human Nature, was putting the finishing touches to the modifications of its 
first part, he left there these memorable words: “When we go through librar-
ies, convinced of these principles, what havoc must we make? If we take in 
our hand any volume – of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance – let 
us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning about quantity or number? No. 
Does it contain any experiential reasoning about matters of fact and exist-
ence? No. Then throw it in the fire, for it can contain nothing but sophistry 
and illusion”. Although Hume removed those fragments of the Treatise which 
could directly negate the possibility of rational theology out of concern about 
its reception, his later works confirmed his scepticism in religious matters. 
However, not only does the quoted ending of An Inquiry Concerning Human 
Understanding express his conviction about the impossibility of rational the-
ology, but also his confidence about its detriment. The analyses conducted 
by Hume prove that what appeared to be the domain of reason, such as the 
argumentation concerning the existence of the Creator, turns out to belong to 
the affective aspect of human nature. They demonstrated that if religion can 
be considered as an element of individual human convictions, then it should 
lose its place in the domain of authoritarian rationality. The criticism of the 
ontological argument, causality argument, and the teleological argument 
held by Hume, subverted the traditional ways of argumentation justifying the 
existence of God. From this perspective, the entirety of Hume’s philosophical 
project appears to be an analysis of faults in earlier philosophical systems, in 
which the notion of absolute being played the crucial role. If we interpret the 




in many aspects it  contains a new metaphysics (which he mentions in the 
Inquiry) and epistemology (which he does in the Treatise), which should be 
independent of this notion.
roughly speaking, this is the interpretative stance taken in the newly pub-
lished book by Tomasz Sieczkowski, David Hume. Krytyka episteologii [David 
Hume. Critique of Epistheology]. The title signals a basic idea, to which Trea-
tise of Human Nature submits: making the theory of cognition independ-
ent of the substantialist, 17th century metaphysics with its principal notion 
of God. In Hume’s philosophy interpreted that way, the completeness of the 
process that was started in political philosophy by Thomas Hobbes, in eth-
ics by Shaftesbury, in the process of rationalising religion by english deists, 
and whose epistemological sources could be found in John locke’s theory of 
ideas, is being done. The justification for turning the ‘non-epistheological’ 
perspective into the axis of the entire treatise, is provided, according to the 
author, by Hume’s biography, the manner in which his philosophy was in-
terpreted during his life (unanimous judgement about its anti-religious sig-
nificance), the standpoint of contemporary researchers and, last but not least, 
the close reading of the works by the Scottish philosopher. Sieczkowski is 
conscious of the difficulties that the texts pose to their interpreters. He even 
highlights them by invoking the opinions of other commentators and provid-
ing his own analyses. Although contemporary scholars are not unanimous 
as far as interpretations are concerned, the acceptance of the thesis that the 
author of the Treatise consistently realised his philosophical idea is fertile in 
terms of cognition, and its results are interesting. The author’s critical aware-
ness deserves to be mentioned. He realises that the interpretation of Hume’s 
philosophy, whose content is abundant, does not have to use atheism as its 
starting point. It is certainly a question of the assumed perspective: if such 
a thesis had not been used in the starting point, it may have as well been used 
as a conclusion of more detailed analyses. One may debate whether Hume’s 
standpoint should be defined as atheism, or only agnosticism, but it actually 
may be interpreted as a coherent description of the consistency of a philo-
sophical standpoint devoid of relations with religious theses which assume 
the existence of God (including epistemological issues, as well as broadly un-
derstood social issues).
The book is comprised of two, or in fact three main parts: two, as the first 
chapter is dedicated to the description of 17th century epistemology which is 
theologically conditioned (in Sieczkowski’s nomenclature: ‹epistheology›); in 
the second part, which is dedicated to Hume, the author demonstrates the 
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destruction of epistheology in Hume’s works. At the same time, we may talk 
about the division into three parts, as the second chapter is broken into two 
parts, the first of which refers to the criticism of theology and religion, and 
the other to a description of basic notions which are used by Hume at the 
beginning of his theoretical works: the Treatise and the Inquiry. The author 
suggests that Hume’s works should not be interpreted linearly but in accord-
ance with the idea which was expressed in a quote at the beginning of our 
review from An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. This operation 
has a twofold justification: firstly, it derives from the thesis of the nature of 
Hume’s undertaking that is critical and sceptical towards 17th century phi-
losophy, which has been assumed in Sieczkowski’s monograph, and secondly, 
and this is my personal remark, it makes it possible to avoid many traps of 
the conceptual analysis of the Treatise itself. As far as the latter is concerned, 
the significance of certain solutions (e.g. as elementary as the division per-
ceptions into impressions and ideas from the first chapter of the work) is re-
vealed only later (in this case together with the role played by belief in human 
mind). Thus, such a non-linear presentation of Hume’s philosophy is entirely 
justifiable.
According to Sieczkowski, modern philosophy, which has been develop-
ing since Descartes, was driven by the ideal of contemplative, theoretical 
cognition. It was founded on Plato’s theory of ideas and rooted in Christian 
philosophy. According to this interpretation, the validity of knowledge is de-
pendent on the notion of the absolute being which, in a religious dimension, 
is equivalent to the Creator of the world, whereas in the cognitive dimension, 
it is the guarantor of the authenticity of cognition. In other words, modern 
philosophy developed the motif which was presented in a distinctive man-
ner in rené Descartes’ Meditations: as far as cognition is concerned, only 
scepticism that has been left behind by the ‘evil genius’ is possible, or reliable 
cognition guaranteed by the benevolent God. Although the thesis in such 
a form is rather general, and using it as the key to interpreting contempo-
rary philosophy simplifies many issues (e.g. relationship between the order 
of metaphysics and knowledge about nature), the author skilfully manages to 
defend it using numerous analyses of works, not only by Descartes, but also 
by leibniz, Spinoza, malebranche, and others. At this juncture, the author’s 
erudition should be given credit to.
The second part contains an analysis of Hume’s criticism of religion. Al-
though it is usually interpreted as an independent part of his philosophy, or 
as a result of him taking over certain epistemological theses, the order in the 
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reviewed monograph is reversed: it is not about the issue whether one may 
justifiably speak about the existence of God on the basis of assumed episte-
mological premises, or whether standpoints within the philosophy of religion 
may be subjected to criticism. Quite the contrary; according to Sieczkowski, 
Hume seems to be asking: “If there is no God, or if the question of faith be-
longs only to the ‘order of the heart’ then what do we know?”. We were faced 
with an analogical situation in the case of George Berkeley, who used the 
assumptions of empiricism to the opposite end, asking “There is God – what 
next?”, which corroborates with the thesis from the monograph concerning 
the predominance of practical issues over theoretical ones, at least in relation 
to most of modern British philosophy.
The last part of the book, which is dedicated directly to Hume’s theoretical 
philosophy and contains detailed analyses concerning the network of cat-
egories for the most essential notions which describe, according to the in-
tentions of the author of Treatise – the whole of human nature. Apart from 
some detailed analyses of Hume’s basic concepts (referring to perceptions 
and their types) and issues such as the plausibility of existential judgements, 
personal identity, the matter of human will or causality, Sieczkowski presents 
a convincing metaphor of Hume’s undertaking as “the geography of mind”. In 
fact, if we take seriously the subtitle of the Treatise, in which Hume writes that 
it  constitutes “an attempt to introduce experimental reasoning into moral 
subjects”, the first two books of that work may be taken for an attempt to 
describe direct component elements of thinking. Hence, the ‘cartographic’ 
metaphor seems to be quite accurate.
The author does not avoid syntheses. On the one hand, he tries to capture 
the full nature of Hume’s philosophy, and on the other, the predilection for 
illustrative shortcuts relates also to larger intellectual formations. In the part 
devoted to tradition that Hume referred to, we read: “Notably, leaving con-
tinental europe means the change of the language used by philosophy, and 
the elevated ideal, which operates with the concepts of good, happiness, love 
and delight, turns into banal and mundane practical calculation” (p. 32). Al-
though one may find exceptions which would contradict such generalisations 
(Cambridge Platonists or Shaftesbury could serve as an example), they en-
able an overall review and are supported by accurate examples. When read-
ing modern British philosophers, it is hard to resist the temptation to think 
that theoretical solutions were indeed meaningful for them if they provided 
a back-up for discussing or criticising practical matters: religious, moral, 
political, or social. Hence, the chapter that ends Sieczkowski’s book titled: 
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“Conclusion: from the epistheological ‘self ’ to socially affective ‘self ’” crowns 
not only the book and Hume’s philosophy, but also constitutes a summary of 
various processes which took place in the contemporary British philosophy 
of the 17th and 18th century.
The only reservation that one may have about the book reviewed is not 
concerned with the analyses or interpretations of Hume’s philosophy, as the 
author is too competent to suspect him of sloppiness or superficiality, but 
with locke. Ample references to the 17th century philosophy, especially to the 
Cartesian tradition, must be deemed justifiable and needed, if British empiri-
cism emerged from the discussion over the 17th century metaphysics. How-
ever, it is difficult not to get the impression that in juxtaposition with them, 
the english philosopher was slightly neglected, and his genetic empiricism 
was deemed as unfinished and reduced to a faulty philosophical project. Cer-
tainly, from the point of view of Hume’s solutions, such an interpretation may 
be justifiable; however, a remark that locke allegedly did not see the problem 
of the status of empiricism and, in connection with that, did not conduct the 
proper criticism of knowledge would require a few words of comment.
It is clear that in many issues, especially the issue of religion, locke’s atti-
tude was rather conservative, whereas the critical prowess of his philosophi-
cal conception and the project of rationalising religion was only observed 
by the deists such as John Toland or Anthony Collins. Truly, it  is hard not 
to agree that in this case locke stopped half-way between, as if he had been 
disturbed by the possible consequences of his philosophy. Yet locke’s ‘new 
way of ideas’ was to allow him to combine subjectivism and individualism of 
experience with proving the possibility of knowledge. Suffice it to say, if the 
second book of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding contains a pres-
entation of the history of ideas, then the subsequent books complement this 
conception by the description of the manner in which the language allows to 
mediate experiences and how knowledge is built. Thus, the theory of ideas 
(largely psychological in nature) is complemented by providing the condi-
tions for natural knowledge both as natural history and the philosophy of 
nature. The crowning of the entire structure is provided by metaphysics; how-
ever, the notion of God plays only a regulatory role. It is worth mentioning 
for several reasons. Firstly, locke so frequently indicates various deficiencies 
of human understanding which stand in the way of building knowledge that 
anyone arguing that the true title of his work should be Essay Concerning 
Human Un-understanding would be quite correct. Hence the allegation that 
locke did not note the status of empiricism seems to be misguided and refers 
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to empiricism in Hume’s later version. locke’s empiricism largely aims at jus-
tifying the possibilities of the 17th century scientific knowledge and in this re-
spect locke was fully aware of its limitations. However, one should agree here 
with the author’s opinion that locke’s philosophy is strongly embedded in 
the 17th century metaphysics, and the allusions to Descartes or malebranche 
are rather strong. Secondly, the distance between us and the achievements 
of modern philosophers causes that, as much the researchers often focus on 
epistemological problems or metaphysics, they often pay less attention to 
discussing the issues related to the philosophy of science, as it  has greatly 
evolved since those times. Nonetheless, extensive fragments of locke’s Essay, 
of several writings by Berkeley, together with certain fragments of Hume’s 
Treatise of Human Nature, refer to it.
In conclusion, it  is worth drawing attention to some additional circum-
stances as regards the publication of Sieczkowski’s book. Firstly, except for 
Berkeley, Hume is the most thoroughly interpreted modern British philos-
opher in Poland. Practically all of his works are available (soon a volume 
containing the last of his previously untranslated essays will be published 
by Toruń philosophical circles) and the recently published monographs by 
mirosław rutkowski (Rola rozumu w decyzjach moralnych. Etyka Davida 
Hume’a [Role of mind in moral decisions. David Hume’s ethics], 2001), To-
masz Tulejski (Konserwatyzm bez Boga. Dawida Hume’a wizja społeczeństwa, 
państwa i prawa [Conservatism without God. David Hume’s vision of society, 
state and law], 2009) and me (Kategorie „podmiotu” i „przedmiotu” w Dawida 
Hume’a nauce o naturze ludzkiej, [Categories of ‘subject’ and ‘object’ in Da-
vid Hume’s science on human nature], 2005) provide an insight into various 
aspects of his philosophy. Although for researchers who deal with Hume’s 
philosophy, his religious agnosticism may seem quite obvious, it has not been 
properly handled yet. What is more, contrary to the frequently asked ques-
tion “Was Hume an atheist?” the issue of his atheism is treated by Sieczkowski 
in terms of a philosophical, rather than historical or biographical issue. This 
is about presenting the whole of Hume’s philosophy as an attempt to rebuild 
the entire epistemology in a way that makes it independent of relations with 
religion and theology.
I am very glad that the book has been published, and even more so, as 
it was written by an expert and an erudite. The author of the book has been 
previously known as a translator and editor of works dedicated to Hume: in 
2004, together with Dawid misztal, he published a new translation of An En-
quiry Concerning Human Understanding, whereas in 2007, he edited a special 
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double issue of “Nowa krytyka” journal dedicated to Hume, in which, apart 
from an article and translations he included a bibliography of the Scottish 
philosopher in Polish. This versatility is important as Hume’s writing teems 
with all sorts of difficulties such as ambiguities, and even purposeful throw-
ing off the trail, especially with regard to his standpoint in the philosophy 
of religion. As much as in the Treatise, the difficulty in unambiguously in-
terpreting the work was observed, which often gave rise to accusations that 
it is incoherent, then in the case of religious criticism an exact establishment 
of Hume’s standpoint still remains a mystery for some scholars. This can be 
blamed on the author’s stratagem to present different critical arguments in 
various works. He was also very implicit about expressing certain opinions 
(the best example being the XI chapter of the Inquiry entitled A particular 
providence and a future state). In short, Hume’s oeuvre puts great demands 
on its interpreter. Not only does it require his attention, but also good will, if 
he is to find its systematic character.
eighty years ago, etienne Gilson presented an equally synthetic descrip-
tion of Hume’s philosophy in The Unity of Philosophical Experience. That in-
terpretation was made from a different standpoint for Gilson was an inquisi-
tive researcher of Christian philosophy, chiefly St. Thomas and St. Augustine. 
However, the conclusions were quite similar to those formulated now by To-
masz Sieczkowski. Gilson interpreted Hume’s scepticism and his negation of 
modern metaphysical tradition as the fall of philosophy, even if it was to be 
a recurring fall and possible to overcome. The author of the Critique of epis-
theology, with all due respect for Hume, admits that although the effort of the 
Scottish philosopher led to widespread, radical and thorough philosophical 
studies, their destructive result may be considered, as he writes, “a spectac-
ular, yet unsuccessful philosophical attempt to constitute that which is im-
possible (e.g. a corresponding model of cognition) after a previous rejection 
of theological allusions” (p. 26). One should agree that in a cognitive sense 
a failed attempt does not have to mean a failure. moreover, Sieczkowski’s in-
terpretation is well-justified and the distinctness of the thesis will make it an 
important landmark for any future researchers who will deal with modern 
British philosophy.
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